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Getting around the Halting Problem
by X.Y. Newberry
Preamble
Sections 2 and 3 are optional, but they put things in a perspective.
1.  Computability
1.1 The Thesis
Perhaps the most direct way to state the thesis is with a bit of pseudo-code. Let A(n, m) be a 
program 1) with the following properties:
    * If A(n, m) halts then C_n(m) does not halt.
    * A(n, m) is sound and consistent. It never proves a contradiction, it never says that C_n(m)
does not halt when it does. 
C_n() is a program with index n in some exhaustive enumeration of all possible programs, m 
is a program’s index in the same enumeration. 2)
Let us construct a program
C_k(n) {
   A(n,n)
}
and
C_s() { 
   C_k(s)
} 
[The Recursion Theorem guarantees the existence of C_s(), Appendix A.] I claim the 
existence of program A(n, m) such that
 A(s, *)  does not halt 3)
 A(k, s)  does halt.
1  Or equivalently a Turing machine.
2 The notation and presentation closely follows Penrose (1994 , pp. 73-75).
3 The asterisk ‘*’ stands for “don’t care”.
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A(k, s) halting can be interpreted as “it is not true that C_s() does not halt” as opposed to “it 
is false that C_s() does not halt.” Needles to say this implies that the false sentences are a 
proper subset of the sentences that are not true.
1.2 The Halting Theorem
Program A() enables us to determine when a computation does not halt. Determining when a 
computation does halt can be accomplished with an emulator B(n, m), which simply halts 
when C_n(m) halts. Thus a complete decider H() would consists of A() and B() running in 
parallel. Symbolically we can express this as
H(n, m)  =  A(n, m)  ||  B(n, m)
When A() halts H() will return 0, when B() halts H() will return 1. We do not need to worry 
unduly about the cases when the computation does halt though.
The postulated decider H() will tell us about all the cases when a computation does halt and 
about some of the cases when it does not. Quite powerful deciders can be constructed. An 
example would an equivalent of the proof predicate in PA. 4) Such a decider would probably 
tell us everything we ever wanted to know about halting and more, but it will not tell us all. 
So says the Halting Theorem, which we will now briefly recapitulate. 
The Halting Theorem basically states that A() cannot determine that C_s() does not halt. The 
argument might go as follows: First assume that C_s() halts. Then, by the Recursion 
Theorem, C_k(s) halts implying that C_s() does not halt. A contradiction. So C_s() does not 
halt. Now assume that A(s, *) halts. Then C_k(s) halts, but then C_s() halts. Another 
contradiction. So A(s, *) does not halt. Therefore A() cannot prove that C_s() does not halt. 
QED.
For a sketch of A() please see Appendix B.
4  More on this on page 11.
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1.3 Tripartition
Is it possible that A() determines that C_k(s) does not halt, but is unable to determine that 
C_s() does not halt? After all the Recursion Theorem states that if C_s() halts then C_k(s) 
halts and vice versa. Let’s take a look.
First of all, does C_k(s)↑ 5) imply C_s()↑? No, it does not. Program A() and its derivatives 
“say” something  only when they halt. But C_k(s) does not halt, so it does not say anything. 
In this sense it certainly does not imply anything. In fact when A(k, s) halts it asserts that 
C_k() does not say anything about C_s()! 
But can we show that C_s() does not halt by reductio ad absurdum?
 If C_s() halts then C_k(s) halts. A contradiction. Hence C_s() does not halt.
This is but a restatement of the Halting Theorem proof. But H() itself cannot render this 
argument. First H() needs to express the premise “C_s() halts”. How is H() going to do that? 
Perhaps C_s() could simply halt, and thus show if not say that it has halted. In this case it 
would indeed contradict itself. But we already know that this is not going to happen. 
Certainly H() cannot demonstrate this argument. The only other way H() can say that C_s() 
halts is by B(s, *) halting. But then we get a different argument:
(1) A(k, s)↓  Assumption 1 (undischarged)
(2) B(s, *)↓ Assumption 2 (from above paragraph) 
(3) B(k, s)↓ From (2) by RC 6), contradicts (1)
(4) ~B(s, *)↓  [potentially A(b, s)↓] Conclusion by RAA 7), (2) discharged
or more verbosely
(1) C_k(s) has been determined not to halt. Assumption 1 (undischarged)
(2) C_s() has been determined to halt. Assumption 2 (from above paragraph) 
(3) C_k(s) has been be determined to halt. From (2) by RC, contradicts (1)
(4) It cannot be determined that C_s() halts. Conclusion by  RAA, (2) discharged
5 The up arrow ‘↑’ indicates that the program does not halt, down arrow ‘↓’ will mean that the program does halt.
6 Recursion Theorem
7 Reductio ad absurdum
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So H() can potentially conclude that B(s, *) does not halt. But that is not a contradiction.
We observe that with respect to H() there are three kinds of programs:
1. Programs determined to halt 
2. Programs determined not to halt 
3. Indeterminate programs
The above argument has just eliminated option 1. Two possibilities remain. Either it can be 
determined that C_s() does not halt or C_s() is indeterminate. We already know by the 
Halting Theorem that A() cannot determine that C_s() does not halt, so in fact it is 
indeterminate. But C_s() being indeterminate does not contradict that it can be determined
that C_k(s) does not halt. A() identified a case it cannot decide. Thus when A(k, s) halts it 
“says” that it cannot be determined that C_s() does not halt, and it implies that it cannot be 
determined that C_s() does halt. There does not appear to be any compelling reason to 
believe that just because A() halts on <k, s> it is obliged to halt on s. 
1.4 Recursion Theorem Revisited
So H() can determine that C_k(s) does not halt, but cannot determine that C_s() does not 
halt. In fact it can determine that it cannot determine that C_s() does not halt. [A(k, s)↓] 
What do we make out of this? Perhaps the best way to think about it is that “C_k(s) halts” is 
false, but “C_s() halts” is not true.
Let us return to the Recursion Theorem: For any program int T(int) there exists a 
program int R() such that
T(r) = R()
where r is the index of R in some exhaustive enumeration of all possible programs. The 
proof is by construction [Appendix A.] It means that whenever T(r) computes something 
then R() computes the same thing and vice versa. But what if T(r) computes nothing, i.e. 
what if T(r) does not halt? We have seen above there are cases 8) that from the point of view 
of our hypothetical halting decider H() the fate of R() is unknown. The best we can do is to 
say that H() cannot prove that R() halts. We can capture these observations in a table.
8 When A() performs computations on programs constructed from itself.
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R() T(r)
determined to halt determined to halt
not determined to halt determined not to halt
determined not to halt determined not to halt
Table 1.1
It goes without saying that the middle row applies to C_s() and C_k(s). It is apparent from the
table that the relationship between R() and T(r) is not equivalence but mutual 
necessitation. D necessitates E if and only if, whenever D is true, E is also true (van Fraassen,
1968, p.138). [The relationship between B(n, m) and C_n(m) is also mutual necessitation. 
Towards the end of section 1.3 we saw that A() could determine that B(s, *) did not halt, but 
could not determine that C_s() did not halt. One way to read this is to say that B(n, m) proves 
that C_n(m) halts. If B(n, m) does not halt then B(n, m) does not prove that C_n(m) halts. 
Again, A() and B() “say” something only when they halt. If they do not halt they say 
nothing, and there is no further conclusion to be drawn.]
One way to interpret the table is to say that H() is unable to verify that C_s() halts. We have a 
modified table:
R() T(r)
verifiably halts verifiably halts
not verifiable that it halts verifiably does not halt
verifiably does not halt verifiably does not halt
Table 1.2
But if we take the position that only verifiable (and verified) propositions are true, i.e. if true 
= verifiable then we have yet another table:
R() T(r)
halts halts
not true that it halts does not halt
does not halt does not halt
Table 1.3
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In section 1.3 we attempted the following argument: If C_s() halts then C_k(s) halts. A 
contradiction. Hence C_s() does not halt. Table 1.3 reveals that the argument is incorrect. It 
merely shows that ‘C_s() halts’ is not true. It is in fact a fallacy to draw the conclusion that 
‘C_s() halts’ is false, which is why A() did not jump to it.
Here is another way of putting it. When a program halts then it is obviously true that it has 
halted. If a program does not halt then it gets more complicated, for how do we know that it 
will not halt? Fortunately we have the program A() that presumably can determine that this is 
the case. So when A() determines that X does not halt then "X halts" is FALSE. If X does not 
halt and A() does not say that it does not halt then "X halts" is neither TRUE nor FALSE, for 
there is no grounds for asserting that the statement is FALSE. If you wait for a program to 
halt, and it does not, how can you possibly say that it will not halt?
1.5 The Thesis Restated
The thesis can be restated as follows. Let H(n, m) be a program with the following properties:
    * If H(n, m) halts and returns 0 then C_n(m) does not halt.
    * If H(n, m) halts and returns 1 then C_n(m) does halt.
    * H(n, m) does not return any other value.
    * H(n, m) is sound and consistent. It never proves a contradiction, it never says that 
C_n(m) does not halt when it does or that C_n(m) does halt when it does not. 
C_n() is a program with index n in some exhaustive enumeration of all possible programs, m 
is a program’s index in the same enumeration.
Let us construct a program
C_p(n) {
   H(n,n)
}
and
C_q() { 
   if C_p(p) = 0 then halt 
   else infinite loop
} 
6
I claim the existence of program H(n, m) such that
 H(q, *)  does not halt
 H(h, q)  halts and returns 0.
The second line says that H(q, *) does not halt, which means that the halting status of C_q() is 
indeterminate. There is no contradiction, and H(q, *)↑ does not imply C_q()↑. When H(h, q)  
returns 0 it says that H() does not say anything about C_q().    
1.6 Conclusion
All this is from the perspective of H(), of what H() does or does not “know.” But we know 
better. We have soared to a meta-level, where we can see all the truth with eagle’s eye. How 
have we accomplished that? Well, we have not. We in fact are an H() albeit rather a confused 
one. The natural language statement “C_s() does not halt” is a bit ambiguous. It can be 
interpreted either as F(“C_s() halts”) or ~T(“C_s() halts”). If we take the former 
interpretation then the Halting Theorem is beyond doubt. If we take the second interpretation 
then we know that C_s() does not halt.
The Halting Theorem makes a case for non-bivalent logic. The fallacy is conflating ~T and F 
in our minds under the vague umbrella “does not halt.” But when we make it explicit that we 
mean “~T(‘C_s() halts’)” then a determination can be made that this proposition is true. No 
infinite hierarchies of omegas are necessary.
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2. The Liar Paradox
There is a similarity between what has been said above and Gaifman’s resolution of the Liar 
Paradox. The following is an almost verbatim paraphrase of a few paragraphs from Haim 
Gaifman’s paper. (Gaifman, 2000, p. 3) It may be worth the exercise. The two-line puzzle has 
been altered, emphases added.
The following two-line puzzle will serve as our example. 
Line 1: This sentence is not true.
Line 2: "This sentence is not true" is not true.
By a well-worn argument the sentence on line 1 is not true (if the sentence is true, 
then it is not true).
. . . . .
Let us take a closer look at the failure of the line 1 sentence. The standard 
evaluation rule for a sentence of the form ‘The sentence X is true’ is roughly this:
(*) Go to the sentence X and evaluate it. If that sentence is true, so is ‘The 
sentence X is true’ , else the latter is false.
To get the truth-value of the negated sentence (‘The sentence X is not true’) we 
should apply (*) and follow it up by applying the rule for negation (where the latter 
step is supposed to reverse the truth-value). In the case of the line 1 sentence, the
evaluation does not terminate; the sentence sends us back to the starting point. 
Thus, we get a closed loop. The “go-to” command makes the referring of ‘The 
sentence ...’ operationally explicit. 
. . . . .
The closed loop yields a non-terminating evaluation, and for this reason alone 
the sentence is not true. 
. . . . .
The conclusion that the line 1 sentence is not true reflects the realization that the 
straightforward implementation of (*) fails. It is expressed by using sentences 
different from the one on line 1, e.g. the one on line 2. The other sentences 
succeed because they are external to the loop produced by the first one. We can
already see how different sentences mark different levels. The first sentence is in 
the loop, the second is, in a sense, about it.
 
This is perfectly sound logic! The first thing we observe is that in case of the first sentence there 
is a truth value gap. The second sentence is about the first sentence. The first one is neither true 
nor false. Then in particular it is not true, and that is what the second sentence says. Therefore 
the second sentence is true. So even though the first sentence it neither true nor false the second 
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one is true. But note that the grammatical subjects of both sentences have the same referent (the 
sentence on line 1) and both sentences use the same predicate (‘not true’).  Consider the 
following pair:
       Line 3: This sentence does not have five words
       Line 4: “This sentence does not have five words” does not have five words
In this case both sentences are true. Another example:
       Line 5: This sentence does not have seven words
       Line 6: “This sentence does not have seven words” does not have seven words
Both sentences are false. We can summarize these observations in a tabular form.
This sentence does not
have property P
"This sentence does not have property P"
does not have property P
T T
~T & ~F T
F F
Table 2.1
The table indicates that whenever the first sentence is true so is the second one. Again, the 
relationship is necessitation. A necessitates B if and only if, whenever A is true, B is also true 
(van Fraassen, 1968, p.138) The table further reveals some interesting things. The equivalence 
below is a variant of the Recursion Theorem and it does not hold.
This sentence is not true  <=/=>   "This sentence is not true" is not true 
Secondly, the proof by contradiction works differently. If the assumption P yields a 
contradiction then the conclusion is merely ~T(P), not necessarily F(P).
One way to interpret the loop in which line 1 sentence gets stuck is to say that the evaluation 
procedure is unable to determine that the sentence is not true. However the procedure is able to 
determine that second sentence is true.
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3. Logic  & Arithmetic
Now let us try to bring both perspectives together. The diagonal lemma states:
For any theory T that contains PA, and for any formula φ(x), there exists a sentence ψ such that 
T ⊨ ψ ↔ φ(<#ψ#>)
where <#ψ#> is the Gödel number of ψ. (Paraphrase of van Heuveln, 2013) 
I have argued elsewhere that in non-bivalent logics the diagonal lemma may not be an 
equivalence but a mutual necessitation. (Newberry, 2016) Let Prf(x,y) be the proof predicate in 
PA, meaning x is [the Gödel number of] a proof of the sentence [with the Gödel number] y. When
we apply the diagonal lemma to ~(∃x)Prf(x,y) we obtain
~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y))  ↔  ~(∃x)Prf(x,m) (3.1)    
 The left side of the equivalence is Gödel’s sentence:   
~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y)) (G)
If its Gödel number is m, then This() is satisfied only by m [Appendix C.]
It is not difficult to show that Gödel’s sentence is vacuous. Substitute m for y in G:
~(∃x)(Prf(x,m) & This(m))                           (G’)
And since there is no proof of G then ~(∃x)Prf(x,m). There are logics (such as Strawson’s 
logic of presuppositions, Strawson, 1952, pp. 163-179) where vacuous sentences are considered
neither true nor false (~T & ~F). But
~(∃x)Prf(x,m)                                                (K)
certainly is true! Thus K is not equal to G, but rather (3.1) is mutual necessitation. We can 
summarize these observations in a table that looks remarkably similar to Table 2.1.  The middle 
row applies to the formula (3.1).
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ψ φ(<#ψ#>)
    T T
~T & ~F T
F F
Table 3.1
Now consider the formula (∃x)P(x) and a program
Prog_P() {
   x := 0
   while(true) {
      if ( P(x) )  halt
      x := x + 1
   }
}
We see that in some sense the existence of x is equivalent to program halting. In particular if 
“(∃x)P(x)” is true then Prog_P() halts. If “(∃x)P(x)” is false then Prog_P() does not halt. What 
if “(∃x)P(x)” is ~(T v F)? Then it is not true that Prog_P() halts. But if “(∃x)P(x)” is ~(T v F) 
then neither “(∃x)P(x)” nor “~(∃x)P(x)” are provable, i.e. no sound system will either prove or 
disprove them. So in particular if “(∃x)P(x)” is not provable then it is not provable that 
Prog_P() halts. We can apply these observations to G, K, C_s(), C_k(s):
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Self-referential Characterist. Non self-referential Characteristics
~(∃x)(Ey)(Prf(x,y) & This(y)) Negationnot provable
~F
~(∃x)Prf(x,m) Provable
T
 (∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y)) Notprovable
~T
 (∃x)Prf(x,m) Dis-provable
(Negation
provable)
F
Prog_A() {
  x := 0
  while(true) {
    if ( (Ey)(Prf(x,y) & This(y) ) halt
    x := x + 1
  }
}
No proof
that
it halts
Not true that it
halts
Prog_B(m) {
  x := 0
  while(true) {
    if ( (Prf(x,m) ) halt
    x := x + 1
  }
}
Proof that it
doesn’t halt
Does
not halt
C_s() Not true that it
halts
C_k(s) Does
not halt
Table 3.2
The left half of the table list self-referential constructs and their characteristics, the right part 
lists their non-self-referential quasi-equivalents. The table is a bit of a stretch because 
~(∃x)Prf(x,m) is actually not provable in PA as we know it. But there is no reason in principle 
why an axiomatic system S proving ~(∃x)Prf_s(x,m) could not exist. The formula says that in S
[that presumably encompasses all of arithmetic] there is no proof that Prog_A() does not halt. 
Clearly there is no proof that it does halt either [if S is consistent.] Let m’ be the Gödel number 
of the negation of G. If S does indeed encompass all of arithmetic then there ought to be a proof 
of ~(∃x)Prf_s(x,m’), i.e. a proof that there is no proof that Prog_A() does halt.
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APPENDIX A: The Recursion Theorem
Statement of the theorem: Let T be a Turing machine that computes a function t: N → N. 
There is a Turing machine R that computes a number r, such that r = T(<R>).
[<R> is the description of R; you can think of it as a Turing machine specification or source 
code of a program; we are using “Turing machine” and “program” interchangeably.]
R is a machine that can obtain its own description, inspect or execute itself.
This particular formulation of the Recursion Theorem and the proof loosely follow Sipser 
(2013, p. 252) and Lynch (2010.)
PROOF: We construct R as follows: R = A o B o T. This means that the output of A is fed to 
B, and the output of B is fed to T. 
* A is a machine that outputs <B o T> on the tape.
* B is a machine that from input <M> computes <P_<M> o M>. P_<M> is a machine that 
outputs the description of M.
The output from A to B is <B o T>. B will transform this into <P_<B o T> o (B o T)>. But 
P_<B o T> is A. So the output from B is <A o B o T> = <R>. So the output from B to T is 
<R>, and T will compute T(<R>).  QED. 
We can represent the Recursion Theorem in C-like syntax. Given a function T() that somehow
utilizes a function f() we can construct a function R() whose output is equal to the output of 
T() when R() is passed to T().
int T( int f() ){
   // Some functionality possibly utilizing f()
}
int R(){
   T(R);
}
The outputs of R() and T(R) are identical. The pointer f() provides access to the code of f() as 
well as the ability to execute it.
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APPENDIX B: A() fragment
A reasonable strategy for A() to determine if C_s() does not halt is to call C_s() itself. For C_s() 
is a program that is supposed to halt if C_s() does not halt. So A() can as well ask it. And after all 
C_s() = C_k(s) = A(s,*) are computationally equivalent. In this case when A() is called with s it 
will go into infinite recursion. The program below will actually compile and execute.
#include <stdio.h>
#define DEPTH (1000)
#define INITIALIZE  level = 0; k = (unsigned int)C_k; \
    s = (unsigned int)C_s;
static int level = 0;
unsigned int s, k;
A(unsigned int n, unsigned int m);   // Forward declaration
int checkStack(void) {
    level++;
    if (level >= DEPTH){
        printf("Almost got there. Have run out of stack.\n\n");
        level--;
        return 1;
    }
    return 0;
}
C_k(unsigned int n) {
    A(n,n);
}
C_s() {
    C_k(s);
}
// If A(n,m) halts then C_n(m) does NOT halt.
A(unsigned int n, unsigned int m) {
    if ( checkStack() ) return;
    // . . . . .
    if (n == s) C_s();
    //  . . . . .
    if (n == k && m == s) {
        // Analyze what happens when A() calls C_s()
        // Does C_s() have a base case?
        printf("Program C_%u( %u ) does NOT halt.\n\n", n, m);
    }
    // . . . . .
    level--;
}
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    INITIALIZE       // macro
    A(k,s);          // Does C_k(s) halt? No.
    C_k(s);          // Does C_s() halt? No answer.
    A(s,0);          // Does C_s() halt? No answer.
    return 0;
}
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APPENDIX C: Gödel’s Sentence
Here is a simplified derivation of Gödel’s sentence. In Peano Arithmetic there exists a 
decidable relation Diag(w,y) such that if w is the Gödel number of a formula with one free 
variable then y is the Gödel number of the formula obtained from w by substituting (the 
numeral of) the Gödel number of w for the free variable in w. Further let Prf(x,y) be a 
predicate such that x is the Gödel number of a sequence that is a proof of the sentence with  
Gödel number y. Then consider the formula
  
    ~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & Diag(w,y)) (U)
with one free variable w. Let the constant k be the Gödel number of U. We substitute k for the 
free variable w in U. We obtain
    ~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & Diag(k,y)) (G)
As a result of this construction Diag(k,y) is satisfied only by the Gödel number of G. 
(Newberry, 2016)
Instead of ‘Diag(k,y)’ we will write ‘This(y)’, and obtain
    ~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y)) (G)
We are not trying to show how G was derived; we are rather working with the final product, 
and the predicate This() makes it explicit that the sentence is referring to itself.
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